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ABSTRACT 
In the article I will defend the view that cognitive science needs to use first- and second-person 
methods more systematically, as part of everyday research practice, if it wants to understand the 
human mind in its full scope. Neurophenomenological programme proposed by Varela as a remedy 
for the hard problem of consciousness (i.e. the problem of experience) does not solve it on the 
ontological level. Nevertheless, it represents a good starting point of how to tackle the phenomenon of 
experience in a more systematic, methodologically sound way. On the other hand, Varela’s criterion 
of phenomenological reduction as a necessary condition for systematic investigation of experience is 
too strong. Regardless of that and some other problems that research of experience faces (e.g. the 
problem of training, the question of what kind of participants we want to study), it is becoming clear 
that investigating experience seriously – from first- and second-person perspective – is a necessary 
step cognitive science must take. This holds especially when researching phenomena that involve 
consciousness and/or where differentiation between conscious and unconscious processing is crucial. 
Furthermore, gathering experiential data is essential for interpreting experimental results gained 
purely by quantitative methods – especially when we are implicitly or explicitly referring to 
experience in our conclusions and interpretations. To support these claims some examples from the 
broader area of decision making will be given (the effect of deliberation-without-attention, cognitive 
reflection test). 
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INTRODUCTION: THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
“Consciousness is a word worn smooth by a million tongues. Depending upon the figure of 
speech chosen it is a state of being, a substance, a process, a place, an epiphenomenon, an 
emergent aspect of matter, or the only true reality.” (G. Miller as quoted in [1; p.32]). The 
quote of George Miller nicely describes our bafflement when we are faced with the question 
of what consciousness is. Even though there are many different answers to this question we 
seem not to be able to avoid conscious experience in explaining consciousness and human 
mind in general. 
In his article Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness Chalmers [2] divides problems of 
consciousness into easy and hard problems. Easy problems are those that seem to be at least 
in principle solvable by standard methods of cognitive science – methods that are suitable for 
generating computational and neurophysiological explanations of mental phenomena. If for 
example we want to explain the difference between sleep and wakefulness we need to explain 
neurophysiological mechanisms responsible for generating these two distinct states. If we are to 
explain different functionalities of various kinds of attention, we need to describe mechanism 
that makes possible these different functionalities. Or so the story goes … But even if we 
were to describe mechanisms and processes that generate various cognitive functions we 
could, according to Chalmers (with whom I agree), still ask ourselves “[w]hy does not all this 
information-processing go on “in the dark”, free of any inner feel?” [2; p.203], without any 
conscious experience. We have come to the problem of consciousness which seems to be 
insolvable using standard methods of cognitive science – we have stumbled upon a hard 
problem indeed. According to Chalmers [2] (similarly Varela [3]) we have not and will never 
be able to explain what is it like to be [4] a human being that feels, thinks, has a body that 
interacts with its environment, etc., only by explaining information processes and 
mechanisms. Besides information processing that goes on in the brain, there also exists a 
subjective aspekt of consciousness (and mind) – a certain subjective way in which the world 
presents itself to the one experiencing and interacting with it. The following question remains 
unanswered: “It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the 
question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. … It is 
widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation 
of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at 
all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. … If any problem 
qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one.” [2; p.201]. 
The hard problem of consciousness, as put forward by Chalmers almost twenty years ago, 
still haunts cognitive science in its goal of understanding the human mind. Experience 
remains to be at the core of what it means to be a human being, but at the same time it seems 
we lack any good explanations and descriptions of the phenomenon. In this regard, the 
critique of the traditional computational-representational theory of mind (which and one 
could argue is still mainstream1 in cognitive science nowadays) as a form of behaviourism is 
still pertinent today: “Although the information-processing paradigm was already well on its 
way in 1965, it had not brought much relief from behaviorism’s stranglehold on 
consciousness, the historical, true subject matter of psychology. The mental processes with 
which the newly emerging cognitive scientists began filling the “black box” were the 
observer's abstractions rather than the individual's conscious experiences. It was the study of 
the mind from the point of view of the "third" person, and in that sense did not differ greatly 




In his article Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem 
Varela [3] proposes an interesting solution to the hard problem of consciousness, namely that 
of neurophenomenology2. The neurophenomenological programme is based on three essential 
claims: the irreducibility of conscious experience, the necessity of using first-person 
approaches in studying consciousness and human mind (phenomenology3) and combining 
first- and third-person methods in studying consciousness and human mind 
(neurophenomenology). 
In the first part of the article4 (What kind of irreducibility are we talking about: Did Varela 
solve the hard problem of consciousness?) I will discuss different types of reduction and 
argue that Varela actually advocates methodological and epistemological irreducibility of 
consciousness. I will further explain some consequences this has for the proposed “remedy” 
of the hard problem of consciousness. Than (second part, Neurophenomenology and 
phenomenological reduction) I will briefly present Varela’s programme of 
(neuro)phenomenology and its core element of phenomenological reduction which for Varela 
represents a necessary condition for systematic research of experience. In the third part (Some 
problems of researching experience; Does Varela demand too much?) I will argue that 
requirements for systematic exploration of experience made by phenomenological reduction 
are too strong. I will also explicate some other problems with which we are faced when 
researching experience: the problem of the “right” training, the problem criteria by which we 
could decide whether the “right” state for observing experience and reporting on it was 
achieved, and the problem of the difference between trained versus untrained participants5. 
Nevertheless, I will conclude that avoiding researching experience brings more problems that 
solutions and that contemporary cognitive science is in the need to take researching 
experience more seriously. I will support this claim in the last part of the article (Dubious 
interpretations: Do we really want to avoid first-person data?) by discussing some empirical 
examples from the broader area of decision making, where it is relatively obvious that not 
looking into the experiential part of the mind is especially unsatisfying and problematic. 
More specifically, I will address the effect of deliberation-without-attention and the cognitive 
reflection test in the context of dual process theories of cognition. 
WHAT KIND OF IRREDUCIBILITY ARE WE TALKING ABOUT: DID 
VARELA SOLVE THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS? 
According to Chalmers [2] and Varela [3] reductionistic explanations will always fail to 
explain the “what is it like to be” – the essence of what it means to experience something. 
Varela claims that if we are to explain and understand experience at least to a certain degree, 
we need to avail ourselves of a different research approach – we need to start using first- and 
second-person methods and take studying experience seriously. If we stick with reductionistic 
explanations we will never bridge the explanatory gap [10] between objective and subjective. 
With the goal of bridging this gap, Varela [3] proposes a methodological solution 
(neurophenomenology) which strives to combine first- and second-person methods for 
studying consciousness and human mind, and argues for the irreducibility of experience to 
some “lower” level (be it quantum or neurophysiological). But before we introduce and 
discuss Varela’s suggestion in more detail, we have to clarify what kind of irreducibility 
Varela actually has in mind. 
Within the context of the question of reducibility of experience Lutz and Thompson [11] 
differentiate the hard problem of consciousness from the explanatory gap. They argue that the 
hard problem of consciousness is in fact a metaphysical question about the place of 
experience in nature, whereas the problem of explanatory gap is an “epistemological and 
methodological problem of how to relate first-person phenomenological accounts of 
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experience to third-person cognitive-neuroscientific accounts.” [11; p.47] Under this 
“weaker” interpretation of Varela [3] we have to understand the remedy for the hard problem 
of consciousness as an attempt of a methodological and epistemological solution and not as 
an answer to the metaphysical question of the ontological status of consciousness. 
Lutz and Thompson also claim that Varela in fact tried to show that Chalmers’ question of 
“[w]hy should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?” [3; p.201] originates 
from a false assumption about the world and the nature of cognition. Chalmers’ question 
presupposes a strict differentiation between physical (objective) and experiential (subjective), 
which is denied by Varela’s enactivist view [3, 5]. Modern phenomenology is thus many 
times blamed as being unscientific (unobjective, not studying the “objective” world), but 
according to Varela, this criticism is unwarranted, since it derives from an illusory view of 
science. Similarly as Kuhn [12] criticizes the thesis of objectivity of science, claiming that 
science is always a social endeavour, the phenomenological tradition [3, 5, 13] rejects the 
strict separation and opposition of objective and subjective, that objectivist science many 
times takes for granted6 (for the discussion of these problems in the context of enactivism and 
neurophenomenology also see Vörös [14]). The phenomenological tradition in my opinion 
correctly states that studying so called objective phenomena always entails a subjective 
component, even more so when studying the mind. For example, the scientific community 
chooses problems worth studying, scientific knowledge is always subjected to verification 
from the side of a scientific community consisting of individual subjects who decide what 
belongs to the corpus of scientific knowledge and what not, etc. Nonetheless, both “standard” 
science and empirical phenomenology (see e.g. [3, 15]) try to achieve a methodologically 
strict empirical approach to studying consciousness which is open to intersubjective 
verification of scientists forming the scientific community. From this perspective Varela [3] 
defends the view that studying experience should be brought back into science. Varela’s 
proposal of the neurophenomenological programme can thus be interpreted as a 
methodological-epistemological solution of the hard problem of consciousness, but not as the 
solution to the problem of ontological status of consciousness. From this perspective I agree with 
Varela that experience is an irreducible phenomenon on the methodological and epistemological 
level – demanding the right methods (first- and second-person methods), level of knowledge 
and explanation. In what follows, I will try to explicate in more detail why experience is an 
irreducible phenomenon on the methodological and epistemological level. 
In the context of researching experience, methodological reduction (for methodological 
reduction in biology see [16]) would mean that experience can be most fruitfully studied at 
the lowest possible level, e.g. at the electro-chemical level or the level of sub-atomic 
particles7. As is nicely shown by Varela [3], it is hard to imagine how one could study 
experience on electro-chemical or functional level of the brain and by that explain experiential, 
first-person perspective of the mind. Studying experience on the level of the brain using for 
example neuroscientific imaging techniques, and claiming that we have explained experience, 
is a false belief. If nothing else, when putting forward an explanation of experience, we are 
always referring to the experiential level about which we all have folk psychological beliefs 
derived from our own introspections. In this way, the thesis of methodological reduction of 
experience presupposes the thesis of epistemic reduction. Namely, it implies that we can 
explain experience using only third-person methods without stepping back to the level of 
experience in our explanations of data gathered by third-person methods. For the goal of 
studying a phenomenon is to gain knowledge and to explain the phenomenon. 
In the context of researching experience, epistemic reduction (for epistemic reduction in 
biology see [16]) would mean that we can reduce knowledge about experience gained in the 




knowledge gained in the domain of neuroscience. Even if we had all the knowledge about 
experience that neuroscience can provide with its methods, our explanation of experience at 
this level would lack first-person experiential descriptions/explanations, which are an 
essential part of what we call experience. An especially tenacious problem here is the question of 
explanatory reduction (a sub-class of epistemic reduction). The thesis of explanatory 
reduction states that properties of some higher level can be explained by properties of some 
lower level. Even though we claimed we had explained all properties of the experiential by 
properties of the brain, our explanation would still not include the first-person perspective. 
Leaving out the experiential, first-person perspective, would render our explanation of 
experience incomplete, since an explanation makes sense only if it entails understanding of 
the phenomenon to be explained. Leaving out the first-person perspective, at least a part of 
the phenomenon (i.e. experience) would remain unexplained and the reduction would fail. 
Let us imagine we were able to give a mathematical explanation of experience and that we 
understood (also on the experiential level?) such an explanation, at least after we got used to 
the language of mathematics for describing experience. But such an explanation would 
always, at least implicitly, refer to our own first-person experience which is already 
knowledge and understanding at a “higher” level. Using concepts such as feeling, 
consciousness, deliberation, etc., and pretending they have nothing to do with our own (or 
socially shared) experiential states, is similar to pretending for example there is no such thing 
as environment (however we conceive of it). Similarly, neurophysiological explanations of 
mental phenomena as feelings, conscious deliberation, understanding, etc., necessarily 
include (even though many times implicitly, intuitively) our folk psychological knowledge 
(and understanding) of the experiential, which does not only come from studying 
neurophysiological substrates of the mind, but also from our own introspections.  
As a result, if we are only studying experience with third-person methods, and based on that 
try to explain experience, it could easily happen that our conclusions and interpretations of 
empirical results would be false or inaccurate (as we will see on the example of attention-
without-deliberation effect in the last chapter). Hence, I see no reason why we would not 
avail ourselves of first- and second-person methods phenomenology is offering, and at least 
try to say more about the experiential part of the mind. 
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION 
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY 
Neurophenomenology [3] is a research programme which advocates combining third-person 
methods of cognitive science and first-person methods of phenomenology: “…only a 
balanced and disciplined account of both the external and experiential side of an issue can 
make us move one step closer to bridging the biological mind-experiential mind gap. … The 
key point here is that by emphasizing a co-determination of both accounts one can explore 
the bridges, challenges, insights and contradictions between them. This means that both 
domains of phenomena have equal status in demanding a full attention and respect for their 
specificity.” [3; p.343]. 
We must strive to create a dialogue between the third- and the first-person view of the human 
mind. In neurophenomenological studies of Varela’s school we gather data on the dynamics 
of experience and or instance data on the dynamics of global bran activity. After that we can 
start establishing correlates and bridges between the dynamics of experience and the 
dynamics of brain activity. This enables us to get a better insight into mutual constraints, 
contradictions and co-determination of both perspectives. A good example of such research is 
the study done by Petitmengin et al. [17]. Studying epileptic seizures and the possibility of 
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their anticipation, researchers nicely showed how it is possible to connect, correlate and 
reveal co-determinations of the “pheno-dynamic” structure (first-person perspective) and the 
“neuro-dynamic” structure (third-person perspective) in interictal, preictal and seizure phases. 
Furthermore, they showed that most subjects learn to anticipate seizures by learning to be 
aware of their own experience (through the process of second-person interview techniques) 
opening up the space for developing countermeasures and transformations. Using precise and 
systematic first- and second-person methods – such as interview techniques used by 
Petitmengin [15, 17] – and combining them with precise and systematic third-person 
measuring techniques, we can discover a richer and a more accurate image of consciousness 
and mind in general.  
But because first- and second-person methods are not as developed as methods of third-
person cognitive science, we need to put more resources into developing new and improving 
already existing tools for studying experience. “The so-called hard problem … can only be 
addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools 
enabling them to develop a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical 
correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn 
to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both 
obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself.” [3; p. 330]. 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION 
For Varela the foundation of phenomenology “is the re-discovery of the primacy of human 
experience and its direct, lived quality that is phenomenology’s foundational project.” [3; p.335]. 
Phenomenology argues for a methodological path which does not – contrary to the 
objectivistic, external approach of science – reject experience, but takes it seriously with all 
the consequences subjectivity brings. Varela describes phenomenology as a “special type of 
reflection or attitude about our capacity for being conscious.” [3; p.335] Even though 
reflection always uncovers various conscious contents, this naïve or natural attitude which we 
are used to, contains and unknowingly presupposes “a number of received claims about both 
the nature of the experiencer and its intended objects.” [3; p.336] and by doing that veils our 
insight into the experiential. “The Archimedean point of phenomenology is to suspend such 
habitual claims and to catalyse a fresh examination.” [3; p.336]. 
The core of Varela’s phenomenology is phenomenological reduction (PhR) which enables a 
different, more open look into the experiential and its structure. PhR is an embodiment of a 
special manner of how to be conscious, a special way of how to approach experience and the 
world. It consists of four main elements: attitude of reduction, intimacy with experience 
(intuition), invariants (forming intersubjectively valid descriptions of experience) and training 
(which enables stability necessary for self-observation). In the present article I will describe 
briefly the first and the last element of PhR – the attitude of reduction and the necessity of 
training – since my critique of PhR mainly concern the first and the last. 
The first element of PhR is the ability to change our attitude from our naïve, habitual natural 
attitude to that of reduction. “The point is to turn the direction of the movement of thinking 
from its habitual content-oriented direction backwards towards the arising of thoughts 
themselves. This is neither more nor less than the very human capacity for reflexivity, and the 
life-blood of reduction. To engage in reduction is to cultivate a systematic capacity for 
reflection on the spot thus opening new possibilities within our habitual mind stream. For 
instance, right now the reader is very likely making some internal remarks concerning what 
reduction is, what it reminds her of, and so on. To mobilize an attitude of reduction would 




towards their source.” [3; p.337] By bracketing our habitual structuring of experience and 
suspending our beliefs about how one should experience, the attitude of reduction enables a 
richer and “deeper” insight into the experiential. Such attitude is fundamentally different to 
uncritical (unreflective) introspection, which, according to Varela, presupposes that observing 
experience is simply “looking inwards”. Phenomenology, on the other hand claims, that 
human beings are able to shift from pre-reflective to reflective consciousness [15] in their 
self-observation which allows the field of experience to remain open and un-smudged by 
underlying theories and beliefs. “Becoming aware of the pre-reflective part of our experience 
involves a break with our customary attitude, which tends to be – as we saw earlier – to act 
without being conscious of the way we are going about it, without even being conscious of 
this lack of consciousness. We need to divert our attention from ‘what’, which usually absorbs 
it entirely, towards ‘how’.” [15; p.240] For phenomenology this shift in our attitude towards 
the experiential is essential for researching experience “as it is” and not “as it should be”. 
But as this shift in our attitude towards the experiential does not come naturally, training and 
learning are of utmost importance. According to Varela [3], there is a large difference 
between casual observation of consciousness and disciplined cultivation of PhR. Since the 
state of PhR is a fragile, unstable state which is not easily attainable, one has to “cultivate the 
skill to stabilize and deepen one’s capacity for attentive bracketing and intuition, as well as 
the skill for illuminating descriptions ...” [3; pp.337-338] if one wants to achieve systematic 
study of experience. PhR thus represents a necessary condition for systematic study of 
experience – according to Varela, there is no other way than to follow the path of PhR. On 
one hand, the proposal of PhR as an enabling “tool” for studying experience is a well 
imagined ideal, but on the other hand, I believe it demands too much. If we were to accept his 
ideal (PhR) as a necessary condition for being able to study experience systematically, his 
and other first- and second-person methods would be faced with insurmountable problems 
and rigorous study of experience would seize to be possible. 
SOME PROBLEMS OF RESEARCHING EXPERIENCE: DOES 
VARELA DEMAND TOO MUCH? 
If we take Varela’s neurophenomenological programme [3] seriously, we have to ascertain 
that persons researching and reporting on experience are skilled in achieving the 
phenomenological reduction. The first question that comes to mind, is how do we actually 
know the person who is self-observing is skilled enough in reaching the state of reduction 
repeatedly and systematically. Secondly, how do we know whether the state of reduction is 
stable enough to ensure satisfactory observation and reporting on what is experienced? It 
might seem obvious to some what it means to shift from the pre-reflective to reflective 
attitude, but by what criteria should we go by when judging whether this shift really occurred 
or not? In Varela’s and other proposals it is not quite clear how strongly should 
phenomenological reduction be stabilized to yield a state that would enable acquiring “right” 
type of data from self-observational reports. A possible answer to this problem would state 
that subjects only need enough training and learning in PhR. But such an answer is not 
satisfactory – it does not tell us what kind and how much training is necessary. For one thing, 
if it is possible to reach a stable state of reduction repeatedly, phenomenology should specify 
criteria that would help us judge whether this was indeed the case or not (Petitmengin [15] 
does specify these criteria to a certain degree). 
In its search for an answer many phenomenologists stress the importance of studying and 
integrating various meditative8 practices with phenomenology [15, 20]. Techniques for 
developing the state of mindfulness are an example [21] of “tools” for cultivating the attitude 
towards the experiential similar to that of reduction. Even though such methods hold much 
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promise in enabling better study of experience, it is not clear, how could we ascertain that a 
person trained in mindfulness meditation can consistently achieve the attitude of reduction 
and follow the path of PhR. Also, we should take into account the differences between novice 
and advanced meditators [22, 23]. I do not claim it is a priori impossible to follow Varela [3] 
in his methodological proposition. But I do claim this is partly a theoretical question of 
setting criteria, and partly an empirical question which is in need of a thorough investigation. 
On the other hand, it seems that some methods already used in today’s phenomenology can 
give us insights into human experience. But, if we take Varela and rigorousness of training he 
proposes seriously, we have to admit that today’s phenomenological methods do not enable 
us to study experience systematically. For they mainly do not include such training9, and are 
in this way not so different from naïve introspection. It is questionable for example, whether 
the method of descriptive experience sampling (DES) proposed by Hurlburt [24] is really a 
good method for researching experience. Subjects get very little training (a few days) in 
experience sampling, self-observing and describing their own experience. Also, as criticised 
by Petitmengin [15], DES does not enable subjects to direct their attention to the process of 
constructing what is found in the field of experience (changing the attitude from “what” to 
“how”), DES does not lead subjects through various dimensions of experience and DES does 
not enable increasing the precision of self-observation. Hurlburt and Heavey themselves 
admit that “DES is not interested in the obscure or the hard to detect. It is interested only in 
the obvious, the easily apprehensible.” [25; p.119]. 
DES might bring different data than the method prescribed by Varela, but this does not mean 
it cannot be fruitfully used in researching experience. It has for example already broadened 
our understanding of different kinds od experiential phenomena [26], it has deepened our 
understanding of thinking [27, 28] and feelings [29], etc. On the contrary, I believe that the 
use of diverse rigorous methods is in fact advantageous, even necessary, since it enables 
comparison of results obtained on different levels and enables mutual constraining already 
among different first- and second-person methods10. From this perspective Varela’s 
requirement of phenomenological reduction – which I think DES for example does not even 
try to achieve – as a necessary condition for systematic research of experience is too strong 
and even unacceptable. 
Second-person methods (interview techniques) – also partly used in the context of DES – on 
the other hand enable subjects to a certain degree (or so its proponents claim [15]) to move 
beyond the problem of training in phenomenological reduction by guiding them through the 
process of self-observation and reporting on experience. Even though the interview 
techniques described by Petitmengin [15] are well developed, the question of whether 
subjects actually attain the state of phenomenological reduction as described by Varela [3] or 
the state of mindfulness as described by meditative traditions, remains open. I strongly doubt 
that directing subjects alone can overcome the problem of subjects being relatively unskilled 
in sef-observing and reporting on experience. It is an empirically open question whether 
second-person methods lead to experiential reports (data) similar or different to those 
gathered from subjects that underwent long-term and rigorous training in techniques of self-
observation11. (Markič [30] discusses similar problems in the context of comparing 
heterophenomenology and phenomenology). 
Furthermore, it seems that if we wish to study mistakes made by untrained subjects (or just 
how untrained subjects introspect) in tasks that include self-observation, self-awareness and 
subjective reports, trained subjects are not really an option. An example where we might get 
different results from trained vs. untrained subjects are Johansson et al.’s [31] experiments on 




the change in chosen images of faces and proceed to state reasons for choices they did not 
make (unbeknownst to subjects, the experimenters switched the images). Even when faces on 
images were not alike and when subjects had unlimited time for making their choices, 
approximately 60 % of them still did not notice the switch12. The choice blindness 
phenomenon was also shown in other choice scenarios, from choosing jam [32], to voting 
choices [33]. These experiments nicely show how we act without being aware of how we act 
and report of our experience without being aware of what we actually report about. 
If phenomenology is right and the right kind of training in self-observation would enable us 
to confabulate less (since our self-observations would not be as laden by our preconceptions, 
beliefs and theories about our experience), it would be interesting to do the same experiments 
with subjects trained in self-observation (e.g. in phenomenological reduction). If 
phenomenology is right in its assumptions, than results should be different at least in some 
regards. If this turned out to be true, it would mean that trained subjects cannot be used in 
experiments where we wanted to study self-observation, self-awareness, subjective reports, 
etc., i.e. the experience of “average”, everyday subjects. 
But despite many problems with which studying experience is faced, today’s 
phenomenological methods described above are elaborate and rigorous enough that we could 
start using them more widely. This would enable the comparison of data obtained by a 
number of different researchers and comparison of data obtained in similar studies. It is not 
the use of first- and second-person methods that is problematic. The challenge lies in 
developing better and better methods for researching experience without which our picture of 
the mind will remain incomplete or even false. 
DUBIOUS INTERPRETATIONS: DO WE REALLY WANT TO AVOID 
FIRST-PERSON DATA? 
Not taking into account first-person, experiential data can lead to false conclusions and 
interpretations of results. A good example is the deliberation-without-attention effect13 
(DWA) which was “discovered” in the context of the unconscious thought theory (UTT) [35] 
by Dijksterhuis et al. [36]. Their experiments supposedly showed that unconscious decision 
making in the context of complex choices leads to better choices that conscious, deliberate 
decision making. In one of the experiments participants had to choose between four cars. In 
the first condition they read the description of cars with four characteristics (simple choice 
scenario) in the other twelve (complex choice scenario). After reading description of cars 
participants were divided into further two conditions: one group was instructed to think for 
four minutes about their choice (the condition of conscious thinking with attention on choice 
(CT)), the other group was instructed to solve anagrams for those four minutes (the condition 
of unconscious thinking without attention to choice (UT)). After four minutes both groups 
were instructed to choose the best car (the car having most positive characteristics14). In the 
context of the complex choice scenario results showed that participants in the UT condition 
chose better cars than participants in CT condition. Authors conclude the article with the 
following sentence: “Although we investigated choices among consumer products in our 
studies, there is no a priori reason to assume that the deliberation- without-attention effect 
does not generalize to other types of choices—political, managerial, or otherwise. In such 
cases, it should benefit the individual to think consciously about simple matters and to 
delegate thinking about more complex matters to the unconscious.” [36; p.1007]. 
Even though the question of generalizability of results of the described study to other types of 
choices (political, managerial, etc.) is not as relevant for the present article, it is worth 
mentioning, since it shows how naïve and unimaginably overgeneralised the statement 
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actually is. Choices they studied do not include strong emotional factors, they are done in a 
safe environment of a laboratory, they are relatively simple, do not include other people and 
interactions with them, etc., which are all characteristic of more “social” choices (such as 
political and managerial). Such overgeneralization can potentially have harmful influence on 
approaching various social issues and decisions.  
This experiment is strictly speaking, questionable already at the level of defining positive and 
negative properties of cars, since the experimenters did not study (also first-person), a) how 
much properties are comparable and secondly, whether and how they are perceived by 
participants. Furthermore, Waroquier et al. [37], in later studies of the phenomenon of DWA, 
showed that approximately 70% of participants (they asked them) chose the best car already 
in the phase when they were presented with descriptions of cars, i.e. even before they were 
divided into the CT and UT condition. This means that the statement “unconscious thinking 
leads to better choices in complex choice scenarios” is simply false15. The experiment of 
Dijksterhuis et al. [36] did not study what it intended to. Moreover, Waroquier et al. [37] 
showed that deliberate, conscious thinking led to better choices if participants were instructed 
to remember descriptions instead of being instructed to form impressions about products, 
which is contrary to predictions of UTT. Last but not least, Waroquier et al. did repeat results 
of Dijksterhuis et al. showing that participants were less satisfied with their choice in the CT 
condition [36, 37]. But in Waroquier et al.’s study [37] that only turned out to be true for 
participants with low level of indecisiveness16. On the other hand, participants who showed 
higher level of indecisiveness were more satisfied with their choices in the CT condition [37]. 
As has been shown many times in the past, the picture of mental phenomena and mind in 
general is in fact much more complex than sometimes believed. 
In cases of empirical research where differentiating between conscious and unconscious 
(thinking, etc.) is important, and where we have to know whether subjects are conscious of 
something or not, we need to avail ourselves of methods that allow us to actually study this – 
considering subjective reports is necessary. This would shield us, at least to a certain degree, 
from putting forward ungrounded statements and interpretations of phenomena that are partly 
unavoidably experiential (see chapter on methodological and epistemic irreducibility of 
experience). Even though Waroquier et al. [37] did not use any rigorous methods for studying the 
experiential part of thinking processes in decision making, first- and-second-person methods 
described in the previous chapter – even though not ideal – seem to be well fitted for such research. 
A similar example is the cognitive reflection test (CRT) developed by Frederick which 
consists of three simple questions: “1) A bat and a ball cost 1,10 US$ in total. The bat costs 
1,00 US$ more than the ball. How many cents does the ball cost? _____ cents; 2) If it takes 5 
machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets? _____ minutes; 3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch 
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it 
take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____ days.” [39, p.27] The CRT is on purpose 
designed so as to elicit wrong, fast, intuitive and impulsive answers17. Frederick – in the line 
with dual process/system theories of cognition (e.g. [40-42]) – tries to infer that participants 
who get most answers wrong accept these intuitive answers without further (conscious) 
deliberation, whereas participants that get more answers correct use more reflective 
processes18 (conscious and deliberate processes). His hypothesis might turn out to be correct, 
but the inference from this simple test to the mode of thinking participants use to solve 
questions on the test is only indirect. The step from the fact that CRT is solved more correctly 
by some than others, to the statement that those that solve the test better, use more conscious, 
reflective “mode” of thinking, is rather large. We could come closer to filling in this gap in 




solving the test; what kinds of modes of thinking they are using; how much is conscious 
deliberation involved) by studying the dynamics of experience in a more thorough manner, 
for example by using systematic second-person interview techniques. 
CONCLUSION  
In the article I tried to show that Varela’s neurophenomenological programme [3] does not 
solve the hard problem of consciousness, but it does represent a good proposal of how to 
tackle the hard problem on the methodological and epistemological level. Even though I 
believe his phenomenology (especially the requirements of phenomenological reduction) 
demands too much, his basic claim that we have to start studying experience, if we are to 
understand and explain consciousness and mind in general, is in place. I argued that we 
should not limit ourselves to one “right” method of studying experience. On the contrary, 
using many different well developed systematic methods (e.g. DES and various interviewing 
techniques) would in my opinion enrich our understanding of the mind, since different 
methods would give us insight into different aspects and levels of the experiential. If we are 
aware of limitations and assumptions of different first- and second-person methods (same of 
course holds for third-person methods) and if we invest into developing new and bettering 
already existing methods, we are on a good way of understanding what seems most intimate 
to humans – the phenomenon of conscious experience. In this way I agree with Varela that 
“[t]he nature of ‘hard’ becomes reframed in two senses: (1) it is hard work to train and 
stabilize a new methods to explore experience, (2) it is hard to change the habits of science in 
order for it to accept that new tools are needed for the transformation of what it means to 
conduct research on mind and for the training of succeeding generations.” [3; p.347] 
Avoiding the subjective, first-person aspect could lead us to a simplistic, incomplete or even 
false understanding of the mind, which I tried to show on examples from the broader area of 
decision making. These considerations and examples should remind us that we in fact cannot 
avoid experience in studying the mind. If we will not at least try to study experience 
systematically, as part of everyday research practice, “the riddle of the place of experience in 
science and world will continue to come back, either to be explained away or to be re-
claimed as too hard, given what we know.” [3; p.347]. 
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REMARKS 
1There are of course many theories of cognition that strongly criticise this classical view – 
1most prominently the proponents of enactivism and other more radical theories of embodied 
1cognition, see e.g. [5-7]. But looking more closely at mainstream neuroscientific or cognitive 
1psychology’s theories and experiments one hardly finds systematic consideration of 1experience. 
2By neurophenomenology Varela is not only referring to the “neuro-part” of cognitive 
2science but to all relevant scientific correlates of experience and approaches to studying the 
2mind that are used in cognitive science. 
3By phenomenology I refer to empirical, not Husserl’s phenomenology, although the latter 
3forms a theoretical basis of the former. 
4This article is partly based on [9]. 
5Phenomenological tradition would call persons participating in phenomenological 
5experiments co-researchers and not subjects or participants. An important difference which I 
5will not delve into in the present article. 
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6It is not completely clear to which degree the difference between objective and subjective is 
6eliminated in the phenomenological tradition – completely or just partly? 
7One could of course argue that the lowest possible level for studying experience is actually the 
7level of subjective experience but in fact in cognitive science it is many times implicitly implied 
7that the appropriate level (and methodological tools that go with it) is some level of7the brain. 
8For comparison between traditional meditative practices and western views on meditation 
8see e.g. Walsh and Shapiro [18] and Lutz, Dunne and Davidson [19]. 
9They include some training but not really much in comparison to years and years of training 
9in self-observation of various meditation traditions. 
10It would be interesting to see whether different systematic interview techniques would give 
10us a similar “landscapes” of modalities of experience as described by Heavey and Hurlburt [25]. 
11A related question is how much (if at all) it is problematic if the mediation of the 
11interviewer and/or being skilled in self-observation changes the experience being observed. 
12Experimenters took into account all references to the switch in the post-experiment 
12interviews. 
13This example is also mentioned by Froese et al. [34]. 
14One had 75 % of positive characteristics, other two 50 %, and one 25 %. 
15For a very relevant critique of the statement that unconscious decision making leads to 
15better choices than conscious decision making see also Baumeister et al. [38]. Baumeister et 
15al. stress the important difference between direct and indirect influences of conscious 
15thoughts on our behaviours, where indirect influences of conscious thoughts are more 
15prominent and stronger than direct ones. In my opinion this is a crucial difference 
15researchers should take into account when studying the role consciousness in various 
15cognitive processes and behaviour. 
16Data about satisfaction and indecisiveness were gathered by a questionnaire. 
17The intuitive, impulsive (and wrong) answers which are supposed to come to our minds 
17quickly and are usually accepted without any further deliberation are: (1) 10 cents, (2) 100 
17minutes and (3) 24 days. 
18Even top-end university students, such as students of MIT answered in average only 2,18 
18questions correctly, whereas low-end university students, such as students from the 
18University of Toledo answered only 0,57 questions correctly. The idea is that top-end 
18university students use more reflective, deliberate processes when solving such tasks. 
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ZAŠTO TREBAMO JOŠ SUSTAVNIJE PROUČAVATI 
ISKUSTVO: NEUROFENOMENOLOGIJA I MODERNA 
KOGNITIVNA ZNANOST 
T. Strle 
Pedagoški fakultet – Sveučilište u Ljubljani 
Ljubljana, Slovenija 
SAŽETAK 
U radu zastupam gledište kako kognitivne znanosti trebaju sustavnije rabiti metode prvog i drugog lica, kao dio 
svakodnevne istraživačke prakse, ako žele razumjeti ljudski um u cjelosti. Neurofenomenološki program kojega 
je predložio Varela kao način rješavanja čvrstih problema svjesnosti (npr. problem iskustva) ne omogućava to 
razumijevanje na ontološkoj razini. No, taj program predstavlja primjereno polazište za sustavnije, metodološki 
potpunije razmatranje fenomena iskustva. S druge strane, Varelin kriterij fenomenološke redukcije kao nužnog 
uvjeta sustavnog istraživanja iskustva je prejak. Neovisno o tome i nekim drugim problemima na koje se nailazi 
prilikom istraživanja iskustva (npr. problem treniranja, pitanja koju vrstu sudionika želimo proučavati), postaje 
jasnije kako je ozbiljno istraživanje iskustva – iz perspektive prvog i drugog lica – korak kojeg kognitivna 
znanost mora napraviti. Ovo je posebno prisutno kod istraživanja pojava koje uključuju svjesnost i/ili kod kojih 
je razlikovanje svjesnog i nesvjesnog procesiranja presudno. Nadalje, prikupljanje iskustvenih podataka bitno je 
za interpretiranje eksperimentalnih rezultata prikupljenih kvantitativnim metodama, posebno ako se izravno ili 
neizravno pozivamo na iskustvo u zaključcima i interpretacijama. Za potvrdu ove tvrdnje navedeni su primjeri 
iz šireg područja odlučivanja (učinak rasprave bez pozornosti, test kognitivne refleksije). 
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